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NOTE

THE MISSING ALGORITHM: SAFEGUARDING BRADY
AGAINST THE RISE OF TRADE SECRECY IN POLICING
Deborah Won*
Trade secrecy, a form of intellectual property protection, serves the important
societal function of promoting innovation. But as police departments across
the country increasingly rely on proprietary technologies like facial recognition
and predictive policing tools, an uneasy tension between due process and trade
secrecy has developed: to fulfill Brady’s constitutional promise of a fair trial,
defendants must have access to the technologies accusing them, access that
trade secrecy inhibits. Thus far, this tension is being resolved too far in favor
of the trade secret holder—and at too great an expense to the defendant. The
wrong balance has been struck.
This Note offers three contributions. First, it explains the use of algorithms in
law enforcement and the intertwined role of trade secrecy protections. Second,
it shows how trade secrecy clashes with the Due Process Clause—the Constitution’s mechanism for correcting the power asymmetry between the state and the
defendant—and argues that due process should not waver simply because a
source of evidence is digital, not human. Third, it proposes a solution that better
balances a defendant’s due process rights with intellectual property protections.
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INTRODUCTION
Algorithmic policing is on the rise. Investigative tools like facial recognition, DNA genotyping, and predictive policing systems are increasingly—and
effectively—being marketed by private technology companies as the best way
to police efficiently under tight budget constraints. 1 But because algorithmic
systems are built by humans, they exhibit human fallibilities, including racial
and gender bias, inconsistency, and error. 2 Despite their similarities, algorithmic systems and humans are treated differently when used against a criminal
defendant in court. Humans are subject to adversarial scrutiny; algorithmic
systems are not. 3 The difference is attributable to trade secrecy, a form of intellectual property protection designed to maintain “standards of commercial

1. See, e.g., Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, NIJ J.,
June 2010, at 16, 17 (noting one police chief’s belief that predictive policing was “the perfect tool
to help departments become more efficient as budgets continue to be reduced”); Ellen Huet,
Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It Happens,
FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/02/11/predpolpredictive-policing [perma.cc/7WNJ-KS2A] (“It’s impossible to know if PredPol prevents crime,
since crime rates fluctuate, or to know the details of the software’s black-box algorithm, but
budget-strapped police chiefs don’t care.”).
2. Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions:
How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 31–33 (2019).
3. See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1992 (2017). For example,
human witnesses are subject to cross-examination and information about their credibility—or
lack thereof—must be shared with the defendant. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 57 (D.C.
2006). Algorithms that serve similar testimonial functions, however, are shielded from inspection. Compare Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a Brady violation
where prosecutor failed to disclose evidence about a human eyewitness’s “positive identification
of different suspects”), with Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1169–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018)
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ethics” and “encourage[] invention.” 4 When invoked in the criminal context,
however, trade secrecy shields algorithmic systems from adversarial scrutiny—
even when the Constitution mandates it. 5
It is perplexing that algorithmic systems receive heightened protection as
intellectual property given that defendants’ due process rights do not change
simply because the investigatory source is digital, not human. This is particularly troubling given the government’s affirmative duty under Brady v. Maryland to disclose helpful evidence to the criminal defendant. 6 The Brady
obligation, established by the Supreme Court to ensure that the defendant receives a full and fair trial under the Due Process Clause, requires that the prosecutor turn over any information “favorable” to the defendant that is in the
prosecutor’s constructive “possession,” so long as that evidence is “material”
to the defendant’s case. 7 Favorable information includes both impeachment 8
and exculpatory 9 evidence. The prosecutor must actively search for favorable
evidence not just in their own possession, but also in the possession of any
member of the “prosecution team.” 10 The prosecutor’s duty to search and disclose is “ongoing.” 11
However, prosecutors need only disclose favorable evidence that is “material.” The standard for determining materiality may differ depending on
whether a prosecutor’s Brady compliance is evaluated before or after the trial’s
conclusion. The post-trial materiality standard is well established. A defendant that raises a Brady challenge after trial must show prejudice—that there is
a “reasonable probability” disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in a

(declining to find a Brady violation where the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence about an
algorithmic witness’s identification of different possible matches).
4. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
5. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
6. Id.
7. Id.; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987).
8. Impeachment evidence includes information that would cast doubt on the prosecution’s witnesses or expose cracks in its case. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression
of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 425 (2010).
9. Exculpatory evidence includes evidence that tends to negate guilt, reduce culpability,
support an affirmative defense, or potentially reduce the severity of a sentence. Id. at 423–24.
10. An individual or entity is a part of the “prosecution team” if their role in the case was
to assist the prosecution, evaluated based on “what the person did, not who the person is.”
United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted). The prosecution
team, for example, may include law enforcement, crime labs, and expert witnesses. Youngblood
v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870 (2006); In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719–20 (Cal. 1998); see
State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 128–29 (W. Va. 2007).
11. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (“[T]he duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be
deemed immaterial upon original examination may become important as the proceedings progress.”).
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different verdict. 12 The pretrial materiality standard, however, lacks uniformity. Some courts have imported the post-trial prejudice requirement into
the pretrial standard, while others have rejected it and require only that the
evidence be favorable. 13 Those courts with a mirrored pretrial standard therefore allow prosecutors to determine whether evidence is Brady material based
on their own predictions of the eventual trial’s outcome. The pretrial prejudice
requirement thus makes it easy for prosecutors to manipulate Brady’s materiality threshold; prosecutors can cobble together any number of arguments
that disclosing evidence would not affect the ultimate verdict. Thus, to maintain the central tenet of Brady—that defendants be treated fairly as they face
the machinery of the state—defendants should not be required to show prejudice before trial to obtain favorable evidence. 14
This Note argues that for purposes of Brady disclosures, courts should
view law enforcement algorithms as analogous to human witnesses and
should accordingly implement an at-trial “missing algorithm” remedy when
trade secrecy is invoked. Part I provides the factual and legal background of
law enforcement algorithms and trade secrecy protections to place the question in context. Part II analyzes Brady and its progeny and concludes that algorithmic information falls within a prosecutor’s duty to disclose favorable
material to the defendant. Part III proposes that courts adopt a missing algorithm rule, allowing juries to draw reasonable and limited inferences to safeguard defendants’ due process rights when their access is limited by
intellectual property protections.
I.

LAW ENFORCEMENT ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS AND TRADE SECRECY

Machine-learning algorithms are increasingly executing government
functions. One context in which algorithmic systems are proliferating is law
enforcement and prosecution. 15 As public attention to automated decisionmaking has increased, terms like “algorithm,” “machine learning,” and

12. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (holding that exculpatory evidence
is not “material” unless there is a “reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding
would have been different” had the evidence been disclosed).
13. Compare United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198–99 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(“This [materiality] standard is only appropriate, and thus applicable, in the context of appellate
review. Whether disclosure would have influenced the outcome of a trial can only be determined
after the trial is completed and the total effect of all the inculpatory evidence can be weighed
against the presumed effect of the undisclosed Brady material.”), with Boyd v. United States, 908
A.2d 39, 59 (D.C. 2006) (interpreting Bagley and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), to
require a pretrial “materiality,” not “favorable,” standard).
14. For a more comprehensive discussion and argument that courts should reject a pretrial prejudice requirement, see Jones, supra note 8.
15. For example, from 2010 through 2016, over 2,800 arrests were made as a result of
facial recognition technology. In 2018 alone, facial recognition was used as an investigative tool
in over 8,000 cases. Julie Bosman & Serge F. Kovaleski, Facial Recognition: Dawn of Dystopia, or
Just the New Fingerprint?, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/18/us/facial-recognition-police.html [perma.cc/HU83-Z65H].
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“predictive policing” have become buzzwords, often used loosely and interchangeably. 16 Section I.A provides definitions of those terms and a high-level
explanation of how an “algorithmic system” works. Section I.B summarizes
U.S. trade secrecy law and explains which components of an algorithmic system can be shielded under trade secret protections.
A. What Are Algorithmic Systems?
To understand what a law enforcement algorithmic system is, it is necessary to first unpack what an algorithmic system is. An algorithmic system involves several separate technical components. As the term suggests, the
foundation of the system is the “algorithm,” a specified series of logical steps
used to accomplish some task. 17 The algorithm is operationalized by source
code. Source code is a series of letters, numbers, and punctuation that give the
computer instructions on how to act in accordance with the algorithm. 18 Systems vary greatly in how many lines of source code they contain.
A “machine-learning” algorithm is an algorithm that is “taught” on training data to perceive patterns and to subsequently become better at discerning
new patterns when exposed to new information. 19 Training data is a collection
of examples from which the algorithm is instructed to extract logical rules. 20
“Verification” and “test” data sets are then used to score and refine the performance of the algorithm. 21
In addition, an algorithmic system requires inputs to produce a desired
output. The input is the information fed into the algorithm, and the output is
the information created by applying the algorithm to the input data—for example, whether a person’s picture has a match in a facial recognition database.
Though every algorithmic system requires some kind of input and produces
an output, they vary widely depending on the purpose or design of the system
and can also vary over time. 22
These technical components—the algorithm, training data, input, and
output—are limited by policy decisions implemented by the designer or the

16. See AI NOW INST., ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY POLICY TOOLKIT 2–3 (2018),
https://ainowinstitute.org/aap-toolkit.pdf [perma.cc/X2C6-FPD7].
17. AARON RIEKE, MIRANDA BOGEN & DAVID G. ROBINSON, UPTURN, PUBLIC SCRUTINY
OF AUTOMATED DECISIONS 9 (2018), https://omidyar.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Public-Scrutiny-of-Automated-Decisions.pdf [perma.cc/9A9K-JKBN].
18. Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1183,
1193–94 (2019).
19. Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth
Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 881 (2016) (providing a general definition of “machine
learning” but noting the inconsistent usage of the phrase); SOLON BAROCAS ET AL., DATA & CIVIL
RIGHTS: TECHNOLOGY PRIMER 4 (2014), https://www.datacivilrights.org/pubs/2014-1030/Technology.pdf [perma.cc/NNS7-FS4C].
20. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 12; BAROCAS ET AL., supra note 19, at 4.
21. Rich, supra note 19, at 882.
22. See id. at 921; RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.
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user. 23 Indeed, policies, which are the result of human choices, “govern how
both technical and human components of th[e] system should behave.” 24
These policy limits might take the form of certain prohibitions built into the
algorithm, or they might instruct the user on how to act upon or interpret an
algorithm’s output. 25
A “law enforcement algorithmic system,” as used in this Note, is an algorithmic system that is used by government entities like police departments for
surveillance, investigation, or prosecution purposes. 26 One increasingly common example of a law enforcement algorithmic system is facial recognition
technology. 27 A facial recognition algorithm, broadly speaking, is trained to
identify faces by analyzing images in a historical dataset. 28 A police officer or
analyst can then input an image into the algorithm. 29 The output is a series of
similar photos, usually with a probability ranking to denote the likelihood of
a “match.” 30 Depending on the policies in place, the police officer may or may
not act upon the similar photos by finding and detaining any identified individuals.
Each technical component of an algorithmic system involves human
judgment. The sequential logical steps embodied by the algorithm and operationalized by the source code are written and designed by humans. 31 The
training data is selected by humans. The input is chosen and the output is interpreted by humans. Thus, each component risks human error and human
bias. 32
For example, the historical datasets on which facial recognition and other
machine-learning algorithms are trained are often skewed by race and gender. 33 One dataset, deemed the “gold standard benchmark for face recognition,” was found to be approximately 83.5 percent white and 77.5 percent

23. See RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. While there are law enforcement algorithmic systems that are not “machine learning,”
this Note focuses on machine-learning systems because they are at the forefront of criminaljustice-technology innovation—the inventions most likely to be declared as trade secrets by developers. However, the thesis and proposed solution of this Note applies to both machine-learning and non-machine-learning technologies alike.
27. Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. CTR.
ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com [perma.cc/S5EY-2X58].
28. Amici Curiae Brief of ACLU et al. in Support of Petitioner at 6, Lynch v. State, No.
SC2019-298 (Fla. July 19, 2019) [hereinafter Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief], https://www.aclu.org
/sites/default/files/field_document/florida_face_recognition_amici_brief.pdf [perma.cc/Y97VLGEY].
29. Garvie, supra note 27.
30. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 17, at 11.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part II.
33. See Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 18–20; see also A.R. LANGE, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH., DIGITAL DECISIONS: POLICY TOOLS IN AUTOMATED DECISION-MAKING
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male. 34 Unsurprisingly, researchers have found that algorithmic systems are
one hundred times more likely to misidentify African and Asian Americans
than white individuals, 35 and are also more likely to misidentify women than
men. 36 Illustrating this problem, one study tested Rekognition, Amazon’s facial recognition tool, and found that it incorrectly identified twenty-eight
members of Congress as people from a criminal database. 37 Nonwhite members of Congress were disproportionately misidentified, at about 40 percent of
false positives, despite making up only about 20 percent of Congress. That
false positives are much higher for racial minorities is particularly concerning
given that minorities are also more likely to be subjected to facial recognition
searches for law enforcement purposes. 38
Training data may also be racially skewed because of past discriminatory
police practices. When Black men are disproportionately targeted and arrested by police for drug crimes, or when predominantly Black neighborhoods
are disproportionately targeted for unjustified police scrutiny and intrusion—
to list just a few of the multitude of examples—those racially biased arrests
and police contacts create skewed historical data in which Black men are
overrepresented. 39 That overrepresentation, often interpreted as indicating
11 (2016), https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/2016-01-14-Digital-Decisions_PolicyTools-in-Auto2.pdf [perma.cc/WX9E-JHHL].
34. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities
in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 77, 77, 79 (2018).
35. Drew Harwell, Federal Study Confirms Racial Bias of Many Facial-Recognition Systems, Casts Doubt on Their Expanding Use, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2019, 6:43 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/12/19/federal-study-confirms-racial-biasmany-facial-recognition-systems-casts-doubt-their-expanding-use [perma.cc/WWL9-FEM7].
36. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34, at 2–3.
37. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with
Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28 [perma.cc/X7QE-Z44N].
38. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34, at 2. In a “striking change” for the prominent
supplier of law enforcement technologies, Amazon announced in 2020 that it was placing a temporary, one-year moratorium on the use of Rekognition. The announcement came on the heels
of nationwide protest over racism and biased policing and after two years of advocacy by the
ACLU to stop Amazon from selling the technology to law enforcement. Karen Weise & Natasha
Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html
[perma.cc/KVJ5-E42C].
39. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 41–46. In addition to the examples discussed, there
are many other ways in which training data may be skewed. For example, certain types of crimes,
like property theft, may be overrepresented because other types, like white-collar crime, are underenforced or underreported. Id. at 41–42, 41 n.119. Concern about flawed training data has
likewise been raised in a variety of contexts outside of policing. E.g., Rachel Goodman, Why
Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women, ACLU (Oct. 12, 2018, 1:00
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womens-rights-workplace/why-amazons-automated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against [perma.cc/VB6H-MZEY] (describing employee hiring algorithm that consistently scored women as less successful job candidates than men due to
skewed training data); Angela Lashbrook, AI-Driven Dermatology Could Leave Dark-Skinned
Patients Behind, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018
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greater criminality, may reinforce the biases underlying the discriminatory
practices and produce a flawed, circular justification for increasing the policing of already overpoliced communities. 40 Then, when that biased historical
data is used to train algorithms, the discrimination becomes “baked in” and
can perpetuate and exacerbate the bias—a “garbage in, garbage out” problem. 41
For instance, in 2012 Chicago deployed the Strategic Subject List (SSL),
an algorithmic tool that ranked individuals at risk of becoming either victims
or offenders in a shooting or homicide. 42 The tool assigned individuals a risk
tier, ranging from “very low” to “very high,” but did not differentiate between
potential “victims” and “offenders.” 43 The tool was problematic not only because it weighed arrests rather than convictions as a factor—meaning that the
list likely reflected the Chicago Police Department’s discriminatory practices
of targeting nonwhite individuals and communities— 44 but also because the
factor that most affected a person’s risk score was age. 45 Indeed, 56 percent of
all Black men under thirty in Chicago were listed and assigned risk scores by
the SSL. 46 Notably, Black men under thirty were exactly the same demographic targeted by the Chicago Police Department’s unlawful stop-and-frisk
practices. 47 From these facts, researchers concluded that the tool likely ingested racially skewed data. 48
Inclusion on the list had serious consequences—two-thirds of the individuals on the list were flagged to receive heightened police scrutiny and were

/08/machine-learning-dermatology-skin-color/567619 [perma.cc/H53U-XQCT] (noting that
skin-cancer diagnostic algorithms risk misdiagnosing patients with darker skin because algorithms are trained primarily on data about white patients).
40. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 41–42.
41. LANGE, supra note 33, at 4.
42. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 31–32.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 31 & n.68.
45. Because the Chicago Police Department refused to release the algorithm, citing proprietary concerns, researchers worked backwards from an available dataset of scores (obtained
only after a lengthy legal dispute) to determine how the SSL calculated scores. Jeff Asher & Rob
Arthur, Inside the Algorithm That Tries to Predict Gun Violence in Chicago, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/upshot/what-an-algorithm-reveals-about-life-onchicagos-high-risk-list.html [perma.cc/KCF2-B8TN]; Brianna Posadas, How Strategic Is Chicago’s “Strategic Subjects List”? Upturn Investigates., MEDIUM (June 22, 2017), https:/medium
.com/equal-future/how-strategic-is-chicagos-strategic-subjects-list-upturn-investigates9e5b4b235a7c [perma.cc/Y3HW-H3XY]. Two independent analyses by the New York Times and
Upturn confirmed that age was the most important factor in SSL’s score assessment. Id.
46. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 32.
47. These practices were the subject of a 2015 settlement agreement. See Investigatory Stop
and Protective Pat Down Settlement Agreement, ACLU ILL. 2–8 (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.acluil.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-06-Investigatory-Stop-and-Protective-Pat-Down-Settlement-Agreeme....pdf [perma.cc/7MEP-FSNC].
48. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 15.
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more likely to be arrested as a direct result of being included on the list. 49
While it is unclear how officers actually used SSL predictions in the field, 50
one Chicago Police Department directive encouraged “[t]he highest possible
charges” for all individuals on the list, regardless of their risk score, so long as
they had received notice about being on the list and were subsequently arrested. 51 The SSL is thus a cautionary example of how a tool trained on “dirty
data” risks “perpetuating additional harm via feedback loops” 52—harm laden
with grave privacy and civil rights implications for those targeted individuals. 53
Furthermore, even a simple “accident” in the source code, such as a mistaken ampersand, can result in substantive differences. 54 One study found that
33 percent of “highly experienced” programmers failed to properly use parentheses, which in complex programs could result in “tens of thousands of errors.” 55 For example, source code errors in STRmix, a probabilistic DNA
genotyping program, 56 produced incorrect results—stating a percentage likelihood that the defendant’s DNA matched a sample at the crime scene when
that percentage was off by a factor of ten—in sixty criminal cases. 57 Prosecutors were forced to replace twenty-four expert statements after that coding49. Id. at 31 n.65, 32; see also Jessica Saunders, Priscilla Hunt & John S. Hollywood, Predictions Put Into Practice: A Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Chicago’s Predictive Policing Pilot,
12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 347, 366–67 (2016).
50. Posadas, supra note 45; see also Saunders et al., supra note 49, at 347 (“One potential
reason why being placed on the list resulted in an increased chance of being arrested for a shooting is that some officers may have used the list as leads to closing shooting cases.”).
51. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 32–33.
52. Id. at 15.
53. After eight years of employing the SSL, the Chicago Police Department quietly decommissioned the tool in early 2020 following an investigation by the Office of the Inspector
General. Kathleen Foody, Chicago Police End Effort to Predict Gun Offenders, Victims, AP NEWS
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/41f75b783d796b80815609e737211cc6 [perma.cc
/X2EL-T5DU]. While the SSL is now out of commission, the Chicago Police Department plans
to deploy other predictive policing tools in the future. Advisory Concerning the Chicago Police
Department’s Predictive Risk Models, CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://igchicago.org/2020/01/23/advisory-concerning-the-chicago-police-departments-predictive-risk-models [perma.cc/MCF6-RCWB].
54. Christian Chessman, Note, A “Source” of Error: Computer Code, Criminal Defendants,
and the Constitution, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 186–95 (2017).
55. Id. at 186–87.
56. Probabilistic DNA genotyping programs use algorithms to analyze “complex” DNA
mixtures, samples which contain the DNA of multiple unknown individuals. In contrast to the
analysis of “simple” DNA samples (involving the DNA of just one or perhaps two persons),
complex-mixture analysis involves subjective interpretation and thus does not produce objective
results, nor has it been thoroughly tested for reliability. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON
SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS:
ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 7–8 (2016); PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, AN ADDENDUM TO THE
PCAST REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS 8 (2017).
57. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1244; Amicus Curiae Brief of Elec. Frontier Found. in Support of Defendant & Appellant Billy Ray Johnson at 13, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 11, 2019), 2017 WL 10320827, at *13 [hereinafter Johnson EFF Amicus Brief]; Brief
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error discovery. 58 In one New York trial involving a different DNA genotyping program, the judge granted the defense access to the program despite the
government’s objections to access on “proprietary” grounds. 59 Review of the
source code uncovered that the program had dropped essential data from its
calculations in ways that would have unpredictably changed the program’s
DNA probability results. 60 Once the defense expert witness testified to that
effect, the prosecution withdrew the DNA evidence against the defendant. 61
Additionally, inputs are selected by humans, who may feed nonsensical
data to the algorithm. 62 Yet another variation of the garbage in, garbage out
problem, such inputs would only produce nonsensical outputs. 63 For example,
when the New York Police Department (NYPD) was investigating a beer theft,
it first fed the facial recognition tool a store surveillance image of the actual
culprit. 64 But when that input produced no match, NYPD decided to input an
image of celebrity Woody Harrelson because one officer remarked that the
culprit resembled a Woody Harrelson with long hair. 65 Based on the Woody
Harrelson “matches,” the police arrested the defendant (who was not Woody
Harrelson). 66 While NYPD declined to admit what happened to the nonWoody Harrelson after the arrest, 67 the incident illustrates how prone to human error, and thus how fallible, algorithms can be. In addition to celebrity
images, records show that police departments use other concerning inputs
such as artist sketches and graphically modified images. 68
Similarly, outputs may also be selectively chosen by humans in problematic ways. For example, Willie Lynch was convicted in Florida for selling fifty
of Amici Curiae ACLU & ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Cntys. in Support of Real Party in Int.
Seeking Dismissal at 25, People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (Ct. App. 2018) [hereinafter
Superior Court ACLU Amicus Brief].
58. Superior Court ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 25.
59. Lauren Kirchner, Traces of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/nyregion/dna-analysis-evidence-new-york-disputed-techniques.html [perma.cc/KD4R-Q4S8].
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. While a specific input is not itself a trade secret, the user manuals that may tell police
officers what inputs should or should not be used may be claimed as a trade secret to prevent
defendants from reviewing them. See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1367 (2018) (“Police departments have cited trade secrets as reason to deny open records requests for face recognition user
manuals and audit information.”).
63. Garvie, supra note 27.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Bosman & Kovaleski, supra note 15 (“The New York Police Department declined to
say whether the [Woody Harrelson “match”] had been convicted, but defended its use of [facial
recognition] technology, saying that . . . [it] had led to arrests in homicides, rapes and robberies
and had even helped identify a woman with Alzheimer’s.”).
68. Garvie, supra note 27.
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dollars’ worth of drugs based on a facial recognition database called Face
Analysis Comparison Examination System (FACES). 69 During a drug sale, police officers surreptitiously photographed the seller with a cell phone camera.
The photos were blurry in places and taken at an oblique angle. 70 The officers,
not knowing who the individual was, did not make an arrest on the scene. 71
Instead, they sent the cell phone photos to an analyst. 72 That analyst fed the
low-quality photos into FACES, which produced five possible African American suspects, including Lynch. 73 FACES only designated Lynch at a one-star
level of confidence—the lowest number of stars for “likelihood” that the
match was accurate. 74 Despite the low rating, the analyst selected Lynch and
submitted his identification information to the officers. No other matches
were submitted. The officers promptly arrested Lynch. At trial, Lynch raised
just one defense—that he was mistakenly identified as the seller. 75 Lynch was
convicted, and on appeal he asked to see the other matches produced by
FACES because it would help his defense. 76 The Florida appeals court denied
Lynch’s request. The court reasoned that because Lynch could not show that
the other algorithm-produced matches resembled him, he could not show that
access to those photos would support his argument that he was mistakenly
identified. 77 Of course, the court did not address how Lynch would have been
able to show that those photos resembled him without any access to the photos
in the first place. 78 Willie Lynch was sentenced to eight years of incarceration
and is currently in prison.
This Section has shown that the potential for error—the same flaws, biases, and lapses in judgment that humans exhibit—is embedded in every component of algorithmic systems. However, while that commonality would urge
the same scrutiny for both human and algorithmic error in criminal cases,
trade secrecy shrouds the latter.

69. Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166, 1168–69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
70. Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 2.
71. Id. at 2–3.
72. Lynch, 260 So. 3d at 1169.
73. Aaron Mak, Facing Facts, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Jan. 25, 2019, 12:49 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2019/01/facial-recognition-arrest-transparency-willie-allenlynch.html [perma.cc/7DSC-D5NW].
74. Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 14.
75. Id. at 1.
76. Mak, supra note 73.
77. Lynch, 260 So. 3d at 1170.
78. Further, as Lynch’s public defender stated in his motion for rehearing, it “strains credulity” to say that none of the other potential matches resembled Lynch. Motion for Rehearing
& Written Op. at 2, Lynch, 260 So. 3d. 1166 (No. 1D16-3290).
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B. What Are Trade Secrets and What Can They Shield from Disclosure?
There are four forms of intellectual property: copyright, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets. 79 One central purpose of intellectual property protection is to promote innovation by ensuring the creator has the financial
incentives to innovate given the significant investment of resources required
to do so. 80 All four forms of intellectual property thus provide some legal
mechanism that protects the innovator’s ability to reap the financial benefits
of their investment. 81
Trade secrecy’s mechanism targets misappropriation: the improper use,
acquisition, or disclosure of a trade secret. 82 A trade secret designation offers
“powerful legal protections to companies that want to keep their business
practices a secret.” 83 Trade secret holders receive two types of protection. First,
substantive trade secret protection allows proprietors to recover monetary
damages for trade secret misappropriation and to secure injunctive relief
against future misappropriation. 84 Second, evidentiary trade secret protection
allows proprietors to shield their trade secret when in court, preventing business competitors from exploiting court proceedings to obtain commercially
valuable information. 85
Trade secrets are the youngest and least restrained form of intellectual
property protection. 86 For example, while patent protection requires one to
undergo a formal application and approval process and has a set expiration

79. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61
STAN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2008). Intellectual property is defined as, broadly speaking, “creations of
the mind.” WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., WHAT IS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY? 1 (2020),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_450_2020.pdf [perma.cc/BLP3-K2GR].
80. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., supra note 79, at 2; see also Lemley, supra note 79, at
329–30; Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 262 (1998) (explaining that the “incentives to create” justification is “wellestablished as the principal economic justification for intellectual property rights in general” and
is the “most frequently invoked” justification for trade secrecy).
81. Lemley, supra note 79, at 329–30; Bone, supra note 80, at 262–63.
82. Jessica M. Meyers, Artificial Intelligence and Trade Secrets, LANDSLIDE, Jan./Feb. 2019,
at 17, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/intellectual_property_law/publications/landslide/2018-19/january-february/artificial-intelligence-trade-secrets-webinar [perma.cc/D9VY9X4L]. In contrast, other forms of intellectual property like patents and copyright provide proprietors with a monopoly over the property’s use. Id.
83. Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2014).
84. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1382.
85. Id. at 1382–83.
86. See David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1091, 1095 (2012).
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date, 87 trade secret protection requires no formal process and can extend indefinitely. 88 There is no uniform definition of trade secrets, but they are generally described as “confidential, commercially valuable information.” 89 To
procure protection, the purported trade secret needs to meet just two requirements: (1) it derives independent economic value from being generally not
known and (2) reasonable efforts have been made by the trade secret holder
to maintain its secrecy. 90
The trade secret evidentiary privilege raises the defendant’s burden for
discovery. When it is invoked, the defendant must make a “particularized
showing” that what they seek is “necessary to the defense.” 91 If the defendant
cannot show necessity, then the proprietor can shield the algorithmic information entirely; the defendant is not allowed access even with a protective order. 92
Thus, trade secrecy can be invoked to shield algorithmic systems from
scrutiny at all stages of a case or proceeding. 93 Specifically, the algorithm and
source code, training data, user manuals, and audit information can be
claimed as proprietary under the expansive definition of trade secrets. 94 Law
enforcement technology proprietors and prosecutors have already begun to
invoke trade secrecy to avoid disclosure and scrutiny of their algorithmic systems. 95
The invocation of trade secrecy to shield law enforcement algorithmic
systems is likely to increase. In 2014, the Supreme Court made it more difficult

87. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
88. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (explaining that
an inventor “may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely”).
89. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43714, PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS:
OVERVIEW OF CURRENT LAW AND LEGISLATION 2 (2016).
90. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1985).
91. People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 2015). While the California evidence code does not expressly require a showing of particularity or necessity, the court of appeals in Chubbs read those requirements into the statutory
text. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1352 & n.39. Chubbs “is now being cited . . . across the country,” and other state courts are adopting a similar interpretation. Id. at 1360–61 (collecting cases).
92. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1359.
93. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 1101(c) (providing that “[t]he rules on privilege,” including trade
secret privilege, “apply to all stages of a case or proceeding.”).
94. E.g., Wexler, supra note 62, at 1367, 1370.
95. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 83, at 5 (explaining that vendors selling technology
have fought to ensure that their algorithms are “shrouded in secrecy,” often by invoking trade
secret protections); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19, 23–26 (2017) (noting that vendors will also
often require nondisclosure agreements from their public agency customers); Wexler, supra note
62, at 1360 & n.71 (reviewing cases where prosecutors and developers have cited Chubbs to justify withholding trade secret information).
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to patent software in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 96 thereby encouraging developers to use trade secrecy rather than patents to protect their intellectual property. 97 And in 2016, Congress established the first federal cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation by passing the Defend Trade Secrets Act. 98 The availability of a federal cause of action enables proprietors to
more easily and efficiently pursue out-of-state and out-of-country infringers,
making trade secrecy an appealing choice. 99
Additionally, state courts are increasingly adopting a criminal trade secret
evidentiary privilege. 100 At least twenty-one states have a codified trade secret
privilege in their evidence code, and many states recognize a common law
privilege. 101 While the trade secret privilege was often invoked in civil cases, it
was not until 2015 that the evidentiary privilege was first extended to a criminal case. 102 Since that first case, courts across the country are beginning to
expressly allow the privilege to withhold evidence from defendants. 103 Indeed,
in a span of just five years, from 2013 to 2018, courts in no fewer than five
states denied access to algorithmic information due to trade secrecy. 104 These
developments, alongside the lack of any formal claim requirements or expiration date, 105 heavily incentivize algorithm developers to rely more on trade
secret protections than on other branches of intellectual property. 106
Because evidentiary privileges “apply to all stages of a case or proceeding,” 107 trade secrecy protections can be invoked before trial, at trial, and after
trial. 108 Before trial, proprietors can invoke the privilege against defendants
96. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
97. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1214 (“[T]he uncertainty of patent protection, especially in a
post-Alice world, can push inventors toward the rational belief that the code is much more valuable as a secret than as a patented invention.”).
98. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2, 130 Stat. 376, 376–82
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1836).
99. Meyers, supra note 82 (noting that before the Defend Trade Secrets Act, trade secrets
lagged behind the other three forms of intellectual property, which were all covered by federal
statute).
100. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1350.
101. The states that have codified a trade secret privilege include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Texas, and Wisconsin. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1352 & n.39.
102. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1358–59.
103. Id. at 1361–62, 1361 n.80.
104. Id. at 1362 n.80 (California, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington). Some
courts have denied access based expressly on a trade secret privilege, while others have instead
incorporated the evidence’s trade secret status into their evaluations of defendants’ requests for
access. Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 87–88.
106. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1350; see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–
26 (2014).
107. FED. R. EVID. 1101(c).
108. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1357.
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seeking information about the algorithmic systems used in the law enforcement investigation—information that the defendant could have used in suppression hearings. 109 At trial, the proprietor (or the prosecutor on behalf of
the proprietor) can invoke the privilege to shield an algorithmic system used
as evidence. 110 After trial, the proprietor can invoke the privilege in bail or
sentencing proceedings if the defendant seeks access to a risk-assessment algorithmic tool. 111 In addition, proprietors may invoke the privilege if a convicted defendant seeks an appeal. 112
Law enforcement algorithmic tools are increasingly being used across the
country. Surveillance technology companies like Palantir and PredPol that
market to government entities and police departments claim that their machine-learning technology is the best way to efficiently police under tight
budget constraints. 113 Thus, products like facial recognition technology have
proliferated. For example, from 2010 through 2016, facial recognition technology resulted in approximately 2,800 arrests. 114 In 2018 alone, over 8,000
cases used facial recognition as an investigative tool. 115 And companies are
developing new uses and new tools to capture the lucrative law enforcement
market. 116 Because law enforcement algorithmic tools are becoming more
prevalent and the incentives for proprietors to choose trade secrecy over other
intellectual property protections are increasing, courts will have to grapple
more and more with the invocation of trade secrets in criminal proceedings.

109. Id. at 1365.
110. People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 9, 2015).
111. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1368–70.
112. E.g., People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71 (Ct. App. 2018).
113. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
114. Bosman & Kovaleski, supra note 15.
115. Id. However, some municipalities have recently moved to ban facial recognition tools.
E.g., Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html [perma.cc/D7PD-NYEN]; Ally Jarmanning, Boston Lawmakers
Vote to Ban Use of Facial Recognition Technology by the City, NPR (June 24, 2020, 7:05 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06
/24/883107627/boston-lawmakers-vote-to-ban-use-of-facial-recognition-technology-by-thecity [perma.cc/85EJ-LB56].
116. Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You,
WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2018/04/26/facial-recognition-may-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you
[perma.cc/B5DP-DT25] (facial recognition tools incorporated into body cameras); Maura Dolan, ‘Rapid DNA’ Promises Breakthroughs in Solving Crimes. So Why Does It Face a Backlash?,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-0924/rapid-dna-forensics-crime-police [perma.cc/6JSV-SZST] (rapid complex DNA tests).
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WHEN DUE PROCESS AND TRADE SECRETS CLASH

Trade secrets can be invoked to shield from disclosure significant parts of
a law enforcement algorithmic tool, including the algorithm, the implementing source code, and the training data (collectively shorthanded here as “algorithmic information”). In the criminal context, trade secrecy protections allow
law enforcement and prosecutors to shirk their Brady disclosure responsibilities when they use algorithms to identify, investigate, and prosecute a suspect.
This Part discusses the constitutional tension between intellectual property
and a defendant’s due process rights and explains why the principles of Brady
require that the latter, not the former, prevail.
A. The Brady Doctrine: Human Witnesses and Their Algorithmic
Counterparts
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor cannot
withhold evidence “favorable to an accused” because such suppression violates the defendant’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 117 The Brady doctrine thus imposes upon prosecutors a duty to
learn of and disclose to the defendant any information in their possession that
is “favorable” and “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 118
The Brady doctrine represents a limited and necessary departure from the
pure adversarial model of the United States legal system. 119 Such a departure
is warranted because the prosecutor represents not an ordinary party but a
sovereignty; as such, the prosecutor’s purpose is “not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done.” 120 The Supreme Court created this duty to disclose because “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when
any accused is treated unfairly.” 121 Ultimately, the Brady requirement is a “rule
of fairness”—an essential tenet of our criminal justice system. 122 The Brady

117. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
118. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”).
119. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (“By requiring the prosecutor to
assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure
adversary model.”)
120. Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
121. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
122. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006) (quoting Curry v. United States,
658 A.2d 193, 197 (D.C. 1995)).
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doctrine also serves to safeguard against the inherent power asymmetry between the state and defendant, helping to equalize an otherwise deeply skewed
system. 123
1.

The Rise of Trade Secrecy in Policing

Despite the necessity of the Brady requirement for a fair criminal system,
trade secret protections directly clash with, and pose a threat to, the constitutional defenses erected by Brady. While research in this area is limited by barriers to access, 124 researchers have been able to identify flaws in proprietary
algorithms. These flaws, discussed in Part I, are pervasive in law enforcement
algorithmic tools. For example, law enforcement algorithms have been found
to be systematically biased based on race and gender due to the use of data
skewed by past discriminatory police practices in algorithm development. 125
Because the systems are built and trained upon biased data, they allow police
departments to recast past discriminatory practices as infallible new technology, thereby deepening and perpetuating those discriminatory practices. 126
Law enforcement algorithms can also have mistakes in their source code: even
123. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 757 (2007).
124. Trade secrecy and other forms of intellectual property protection are one such barrier.
For example, police departments have denied researchers’ requests for even the user manuals for
their facial recognition tools, citing trade secret exemptions. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1367.
Trade secret protections are an especially difficult barrier for researchers since trade secrets are
also exempt from federal and state open-records laws, which researchers often rely on to obtain
records from public entities. Id. at 1366, 1367 n.113; see Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552b(c)(4). Other barriers include efforts by law enforcement to conceal their deployment of
new technologies, Joh, supra note 95, at 29 (describing how two police departments shielded
their use of stingray devices (cell-site simulators) for nearly a decade by calling the devices “confidential informants”); other privileges raised to prevent disclosure, such as the “law enforcement privilege,” see, e.g., Puerto Rico v. United States, 490 F.3d 50, 64 (1st Cir. 2007) (describing
how the law enforcement privilege intends to prevent interference with law enforcement investigations, techniques, and protocols); efforts by proprietors to keep their government contracts
a secret, April Glaser, Thousands of Contracts Highlight Quiet Ties Between Big Tech and U.S.
Military, NBC (July 8, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/thousandscontracts-highlight-quiet-ties-between-big-tech-u-s-n1233171 [perma.cc/P9VR-VXR9]; and
logistical hurdles raised by the complicated nature of algorithms, Rob Kitchin, Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms, 20 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 14, 20–21 (2017) (explaining why algorithms’ “heterogeneous and embedded” nature makes them difficult to fully
deconstruct and understand).
125. Tom Simonite, The Best Algorithms Struggle to Recognize Black Faces Equally, WIRED
(July 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/best-algorithms-struggle-recognizeblack-faces-equally [perma.cc/F5D4-KTLH]; Rich, supra note 19, at 909, 922 n.357; see also Sahil
Chinoy, Opinion, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html [perma.cc/68YDWZH5]; Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 34.
126. Richardson et al., supra note 2, at 40–46; Karen Hao, Police Across the US Are Training
Crime-Predicting AIs on Falsified Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/13/137444/predictive-policing-algorithms-ai-crime-dirty-data
[perma.cc/HC9Y-J977].
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an error as simple as a misplaced ampersand can significantly alter the algorithm’s operation. 127 Despite mounting evidence of their fallibility, police departments across the country continue to acquire and implement proprietary
algorithmic tools—often in secret. 128
Prosecutors and proprietors are already resisting disclosure of information pertaining to law enforcement algorithms in criminal cases. For example, the New York Police Department (NYPD) used facial recognition
technology to find a man who stole a pair of socks in a department store using
an image from the store’s surveillance camera. 129 Multiple potential matches
were generated. 130 From those matches, the NYPD detective selected a photo
of Andre 131 and texted an officer who had witnessed the incident, “Is this the
guy?” 132 The officer texted back in the affirmative. Andre’s attorneys argued
that the single photograph and text-message confirmation was the “sole basis”
for the arrest. When Andre tried to obtain information about NYPD’s use of
the facial recognition program, NYPD and prosecutors resisted, claiming that
disclosure would violate the trade secrecy of the program’s owner, a third-party
vendor. Before the disclosure issue was resolved, Andre took a plea deal. 133
Had the other suspect matches come from a human eyewitness rather
than from a facial recognition program, the prosecutors would not have been
able to shield the eyewitness from scrutiny. 134 Brady would have required the
prosecutors to disclose that the eyewitness had identified multiple possible

127. See Chessman, supra note 54, at 187; Wexler, supra note 62, at 1368.
128. See Mick Dumke & Frank Main, A Look Inside the Watch List Chicago Police Fought
to Keep Secret, CHI. SUN-TIMES (May 18, 2017, 9:26 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017
/5/18/18386116/a-look-inside-the-watch-list-chicago-police-fought-to-keep-secret [perma.cc
/E8VF-AAY9]; JAKE LAPERRUQUE, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, FACING THE FUTURE OF
SURVEILLANCE (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/docs.pogo.org/report/2019/Facing-the-Future-of-Surveillance_2019.pdf [perma.cc/K6PM-6JUN].
129. Mike Hayes, “Is This the Guy?,” APPEAL (Aug. 20, 2019), https://theappeal.org/is-thisthe-guy [perma.cc/CX6S-4VJX].
130. Id.
131. “Andre” is the pseudonym The Appeal gave the defendant at his attorneys’ behest. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. E.g., People v. Robinson, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 183, 186 (Ct. App. 1995) (“When exculpatory evidence involves an eyewitness to the crime, what must be disclosed is not just the witness’s
identity ‘but all pertinent information which might assist the defense to locate him.’ ” (quoting
Eleazer v. Superior Ct., 464 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1970))).
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suspects other than the defendant, 135 as well as the eyewitness’s level of certainty (or uncertainty) about each identification. 136 This would be true even if
the eyewitness’s testimony were not introduced by the prosecutor at trial and
only the witnessing police officer were to testify. 137 That the prosecutor declined to use the eyewitness at trial does not negate the Brady value of the
eyewitness’s uncertainty or unreliability. Further, had the prosecutor introduced the eyewitness at trial (or had the testifying police officer improperly or
sloppily relied on such an unreliable investigative lead, as seems likely in Andre’s case), 138 the prosecutor would be required to disclose information challenging the credibility of the eyewitness—including evidence that the witness
was racially biased 139 or had previously given inconsistent statements. 140 Thus,
had the NYPD relied on a human eyewitness in its investigation, Brady would
have afforded Andre the evidence he needed to present a full defense. But
since the NYPD relied on a proprietary tool and could therefore invoke trade
secrecy, Andre was denied that same evidence. 141

135. See Carrillo v. County of Los Angeles, 798 F.3d 1210, 1227–28 (9th Cir. 2015) (allowing suit for Brady violation to proceed because the officer failed to disclose, among other things,
that the eyewitness had selected several other photos before identifying the defendant’s photo
from a line-up).
136. See, e.g., Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that a witness’s
statement about uncertainty of her identification of defendant was “classic Brady material”); Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287–89 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding a Brady violation when the
state withheld a polygraph report about an eyewitness’s lack of certainty about what he saw).
137. Police departments often defend their use of law enforcement algorithms by stating
that such tools merely provide investigative leads and are not used at trial. Compare Hayes, supra
note 129 (“Like eye-witness testimony, . . . a facial recognition match serves as one piece of a
larger investigation. It is a lead, not probable cause . . . .”), with Garvie, supra note 27 (“[T]he
reality is that suspects are being apprehended almost entirely on the basis of face recognition
[matches].”).
138. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 446 n.15 (1995) (emphasizing that jurors must be
able to weigh “the sloppiness of the investigation against the probative force of the State’s evidence”); see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 613 (10th Cir. 1986) (“A common trial tactic
of defense lawyers is to discredit the caliber of the investigation or the decision to charge the
defendant, and we may consider such use in assessing a possible Brady violation.”).
139. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 956 A.2d 375, 380 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (emphasizing that “there is no room for racial bias in any law enforcement investigation” and requiring prosecutor to turn over information relating to officer’s racial animus and use of racial
epithet in referring to defendant under Brady); Gonzales v. State, 929 S.W.2d 546, 550 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996) (stating that “[r]acial prejudice is a prototypical form of bias” and thus must be disclosed as impeachment evidence under Texas criminal-procedure rules); cf. United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that since cross-racial eyewitness
identifications are already “particularly suspect,” suppression of evidence calling those identifications into question was a Brady violation).
140. See White v. Helling, 194 F.3d 937, 943–46 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding a Brady violation
where prosecutor failed to disclose that its key eyewitness had originally identified another individual and only identified the defendant after meetings with the police).
141. Another defendant who was denied access to algorithmic information is Billy Ray
Johnson. Johnson was convicted of twenty-four crimes based on DNA evidence generated by
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Cases like Andre’s illustrate the costs of weakening Brady protections in
the face of new law enforcement technology. 142 The costs will continue to
mount as trade secret protections are increasingly raised by prosecutors and
faced by defendants. 143
Technological advances will also accelerate the rate of trade secret invocations in criminal proceedings. Law enforcement algorithm tools, the components of which can be claimed as trade secrets, 144 are proliferating. 145 These
tools are being marketed as a cost-effective investigation solution to law enforcement agencies, who are among the biggest consumers of algorithmic
technologies like facial recognition programs. 146 Thus, trade secret protections
are likely to be increasingly invoked against defendants’ requests for law enforcement algorithmic information.
As more proprietary tools are adopted by law enforcement, more criminal
defendants will need—and more proprietors will resist—access to algorithmic
systems. Indeed, a similar trend can be traced with tools that have had more
time to be challenged in courts. 147 For example, the use of probabilistic DNA

TrueAllele, a proprietary probabilistic DNA genotyping tool. Before and during his trial, Johnson requested access to the tool’s source code. The trial court denied Johnson access under California’s codified trade secret privilege. Johnson was sentenced to life in prison without parole.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal recognized that Johnson and amici had made a
“strong showing” that TrueAllele produced inconsistent results but declined to evaluate the trial
court’s denial because “any error was harmless.” People v. Johnson, No. F071640, 2019 WL
3025299, at *1, *8, *10 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019).
142. See Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006).
143. See Hayes, supra note 129; RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M.
SOUTHERLAND, AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES
TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 17 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [perma.cc/DNR2-Q5C9] (explaining that a “common
justification[] for nondisclosure” of algorithmic information is that “trade secrecy protections
limit[] disclosure”); see also Wexler, supra note 62, at 1360 (discussing a trade-secret-privilege
case “now being cited in criminal proceedings across the country to justify withholding trade
secret evidence from the accused”).
144. See supra Part I.
145. See, e.g., supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text; RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note
143, at 17; Harwell, supra note 116 (reporting that the largest seller of police body cameras—
now used by most major-city police departments—is developing facial recognition analysis for
live body-camera footage, which may “lead to police misidentifying innocent people as suspects
or wanted criminals”).
146. See Facial Recognition: Top 7 Trends, THALES, https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/facial-recognition [perma.cc/8Q43J5VZ] (last updated June 6, 2021) (“The two most significant drivers of this growth are surveillance in the public sector and numerous other applications in diverse market segments.”); Julia
Horowitz, Tech Companies Are Still Helping Police Scan Your Face, CNN BUS. (July 3, 2020, 8:36
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/03/tech/facial-recognition-police/index.html [perma.cc
/4T35-HC75].
147. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU & ACLU of S. Cal. in Support of Defendant–
Appellant Seeking Reversal at 41, People v. Johnson, No. F071640 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019),

October 2021]

Safeguarding Brady Against Trade Secrecy

177

genotyping programs has rapidly expanded in the last ten years. 148 Defendants
across the country have requested access to those programs used against them;
proprietors have routinely resisted disclosure, citing trade secrecy and commercial concerns. 149 Courts have consistently denied defendants’ access requests. 150
2.

The Need to Treat Algorithmic and Human Sources Alike

That algorithmic information enjoys heightened protection as a trade secret is perplexing given that a defendant’s due process rights remain the same
regardless of the source of evidence against them—whether that source is digital or human. Developers argue that the disclosure of trade secrets to criminal
defendants would jeopardize innovation in criminal justice technology. 151
However, while those innovation concerns have merit, 152 procedural mechanisms like protective orders can ensure that trade secrets remain shielded

2017 WL 10320829, at *41 [hereinafter Johnson ACLU Amicus Brief] (contending that the government’s interest in secrecy of DNA testing software TrueAllele’s source code is “derivative of
a private company’s intellectual-property interest in purported trade-secrets information”).
148. STRmix, one brand of probabilistic DNA genotyping program, was first introduced
in 2012. By 2020, STRmix had been used in over 65,000 investigations in North America and
provided evidence in more than 1,300 cases. Arguing the Case for Probabilistic Genotyping, ISHI
(July 9, 2020), https://www.ishinews.com/arguing-the-case-for-probabilistic-genotyping
[perma.cc/M3YY-SLLP]; see also Survey Shows STRmix Has Been Used in 220,000 Cases Worldwide, STRMIX (Nov. 19, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.strmix.com/news/survey-shows-strmixhas-been-used-in-220000-cases-worldwide [perma.cc/8P3N-99HY].
149. Illustrative of proprietors’ insistence on trade secrecy, Cybergenetics warns on its
website that “los[ing] trade secret protection” would “abolish[] software that finds truth” and
that defense “[l]awyers could destroy innovative companies and put them out of business.” The
Government Wants to Take Away Your Right to Use Independent Forensic Software,
CYBERGENETICS (June 23, 2020), https://www.cybgen.com/information/newsroom/2020/jun
/Government-wants-to-take-away-your-right-to-use-independent-forensic-software.shtml
[perma.cc/T4VH-6N3R]; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robinson, No. CC 201307777 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Feb. 4, 2016), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Michael_Robinson_Opinion.pdf [perma.cc/M5BW-ZVZZ] (barring defendant access because of the “potential
to cause great harm to Cybergenetics”); Brief of Appellant at 25, State v. Simmer, 935 N.W.2d
167 (Neb. 2019) (No. S-18-000500) (noting that Cybergenetics’ founder resisted disclosing
source code because it was a trade secret, though he had a change of heart at the “eleventh hour”).
150. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the Growing Controversy
over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 101 (2016);
Michelle Taylor, Bill Questions Proprietary Algorithms Used in Probabilistic Genotyping Software, FORENSIC MAG. (July 27, 2020), https://www.forensicmag.com/566619-Bill-QuestionsProprietary-Algorithms-Used-in-Probabilistic-Genotyping-Software [perma.cc/XKZ2-X77V]
(stating that Cybergenetics “has yet to lose” when invoking trade secrecy in cases in which
TrueAllele’s findings were submitted as evidence).
151. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foley, 38 A.3d 882, 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (expressing
concern that “it would not be possible to market [the software] if it were available for free”).
152. See Wexler, supra note 62, at 1421–22.
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from the public while still allowing access by the defendant. 153 In fact, protective orders are routinely granted to shield proprietary technology in civil proceedings, showing that such orders are effective. 154 And there are other ways
to incentivize innovation of law enforcement algorithms: alternate forms of
intellectual property, such as patents; exclusive government contracts contingent on transparency; tax incentives; and prize competitions. 155 Ultimately,
the stakes for criminal defendants are far too great to prioritize intellectual
property concerns at the expense of constitutional protections. As shown in
the remainder of this Section, barring defendant access to algorithmic information on the basis of trade secret protections is in tension with the Brady
doctrine. Differentiation between algorithmic and nonalgorithmic material is
unwarranted in light of the principles and rationale underlying Brady and its
progeny.
Defendants’ inability to access favorable information 156 about law enforcement algorithms is detrimental to due process for the same reasons that
defendants’ inability to access that information about nonalgorithmic sources
is detrimental. For example, courts have held that an eyewitness’s inconsistent
descriptions of the perpetrator must be disclosed under Brady. 157 Similarly,
algorithms used in criminal proceedings produce inconsistent results, even
when conducted by the same program. 158 Courts have also required disclosure
of information that links someone other than the defendant to the crime, as

153. Protection orders, while one solution to due-process concerns, do not alleviate the
tension between trade secret protections and the First Amendment or the right to access criminal
trials. Those constitutional tensions, however, are not within the scope of this Note.
154. Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979)
(“[O]rders forbidding any disclosure of trade secrets or confidential commercial information are
rare [in the civil context]. More commonly, the trial court will enter a protective order restricting
disclosure to counsel.”). However, overly protective orders that essentially render defense access
to the algorithm meaningless raise the same Brady concerns; courts should thus be cautious in
crafting protective orders. See Lydia Pallas Loren & Andy Johnson-Laird, Computer SoftwareRelated Litigation: Discovery and the Overly-Protective Order, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 75, 115–23
(2012) (criticizing protective orders with proprietor-imposed conditions like “only handwritten
notes” or no “compiling the source code” for rendering any review ineffective and extremely
burdensome).
155. Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 659, 714–24 (2018);
Wexler, supra note 62, at 1423.
156. Information favorable to the defendant includes both exculpatory and impeachment
evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972)).
157. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441–44, 45 (1995) (finding a Brady violation because
prosecution failed to disclose multiple inconsistent statements by key witness); see also Mackabee v. United States, 29 A.3d 952, 956–59 (D.C. 2011) (acknowledging that inconsistent descriptions were exculpatory).
158. Johnson ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 147, at 14 (stating that DNA genotyping system TrueAllele gave four significantly different likelihood ratios for one defendant).
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when a witness identifies different suspects. 159 Like in Willie Lynch’s case, facial recognition programs can also produce multiple suspects other than the
defendant. 160
Courts also emphasize that the prosecution must disclose any information relating to potential witness bias pursuant to Brady. This includes
whether the witness received any benefits (such as monetary or sentence-reduction benefits) 161 or whether the witness has shown animosity towards the
defendant’s race or other characteristics. 162 Likewise, the proprietors who contract algorithmic systems to law enforcement agencies have financial incentives to meet law enforcement expectations that the tools they pay for will help
maximize the number of successful prosecutions. Thus, proprietor incentives
to design overbroad tools (or to ignore errors that create overbreadth) 163 pose
the same risk to algorithms’ credibility that human witnesses’ incentives pose.
Law enforcement algorithms have also been shown to produce racially biased
and gendered results. 164 It is important for defendants to understand how eyewitness identifications were made because unconscious racial and gender bias
may have influenced eyewitnesses’ recollections, and police officers’ own racial, gender, and confirmation biases may have led them to overly rely on biased eyewitnesses’ leads. The same is true for law enforcement algorithms.
These parallels show that algorithmic information has the same underlying flaws as human witnesses or statements that raise due process concerns
and must likewise be subject to Brady. As this Section has shown, analogizing
algorithmic systems to human witnesses—particularly in the Brady context—
is an apt conceptual framework. Indeed, practitioners and scholars have compared algorithmic systems to their human counterparts in a variety of contexts. One scholar, likening algorithmic systems’ outputs to “machine
testimony,” argues that defendants should be able to cross-examine machine
witnesses under the Confrontation Clause. 165
159. E.g., Jamison v. Collins, 291 F.3d 380, 389, 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding a Brady violation because prosecution failed to disclose “positive identification of different suspects by an
eyewitness to the crime”).
160. See supra notes 69–78 and accompanying text.
161. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 698, 702–03 (2004) (finding a Brady violation when
prosecution failed to disclose that the witness was a paid informant); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (finding a Brady violation when prosecution failed to disclose nonprosecution agreement with witness).
162. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 956 A.2d 375, 379–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
163. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 327, 398–400 (2015) (arguing that surveillance technology companies have little incentive to fix errors in their programs); Jeanna Neefe Matthews et al., When Trusted Black Boxes
Don’t Agree: Incentivizing Iterative Improvement and Accountability in Critical Software Systems,
2020 PROC. AAAI/ACM CONF. ON AI ETHICS & SOC’Y 102 (describing how proprietors might
“avoid costly debugging” by using intellectual property claims to keep knowledge about errors
unknown); Stephanie J. Lacambra, Jeanna Matthews & Kit Walsh, Opening the Black Box: Defendants’ Rights to Confront Forensic Software, CHAMPION, May 2018, at 28, 28, 38.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 35–36.
165. Roth, supra note 3, at 2039–48.

180

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:157

If courts allow prosecutors to invoke trade secret protections for law enforcement algorithms in criminal proceedings, the constitutional safeguards
promised by Brady will be undermined. This Brady carveout could incentivize
law enforcement and prosecutors to increasingly exploit algorithmic tools to
circumvent the duty to investigate and disclose favorable material. Allowing
such leeway will not only diminish defendants’ due process protections but
also cause expressive harm by signaling that the innovation incentives of trade
secret protections outweigh defendants’ constitutional rights. 166 The choice to
protect a proprietor’s intellectual property right at the expense of a defendant’s due process right conveys to defendants and the broader public that their
government values commercial interests over the accused’s interest in a full
and fair trial. 167 That message of inferiority, in addition to inflicting psychological trauma on the specific defendant, 168 in and of itself creates expressive
harm by indicating disregard for defendants and by forcing them into a disvalued relationship with their government. 169
B. Additional Forms of Resistance to Brady Disclosure of Algorithmic
Systems
Despite the similarities between human and algorithmic witnesses, the
latter have proven particularly resistant to Brady disclosure. In addition to the
trade secret privilege discussed above, resistance generally comes in two other
forms: (1) that the algorithm is not “in possession” of the prosecutor and (2)
that the algorithm is not “material.” 170 While resistance through trade secrets
is the primary focus of this Note, these additional two challenges are worth
discussing here because they are often raised in conjunction with or as alternatives to the trade secret privilege. 171 As a result, courts sometimes are not
clear whether or to what extent their rulings are based on trade secret grounds

166. Expressive harm, while difficult to capture in one definition, id. at 494, generally exists
where a person is “treated according to principles that express negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her.” See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1528 (2000).
167. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 166, at 1542–44 (explaining how discriminatory
laws inflict expressive harm by branding the discriminated individuals as inferior and that such
“legal communications of status inferiority constitute their targets as second-class citizens”); see
also Craig Konnoth, An Expressive Theory of Privacy Intrusions, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1533, 1536
(2017) (showing how state privacy intrusions, i.e., departures from the baseline privacy protections afforded to individuals, signal the government’s disrespect to the harmed and signals to
the public that the harmed “lacks social standing and regard relative to other groups and institutions in society”).
168. See Alan Strudler, The Power of Expressive Theories of Law, 60 MD. L. REV. 492, 492–
93 (2001) (describing the difference between “expressive harm” and “consequentialist harm” like
psychological trauma).
169. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 166, at 1527–29.
170. See People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2018).
171. See id.

October 2021]

Safeguarding Brady Against Trade Secrecy

181

or on more traditional Brady grounds. 172 This issue is exacerbated by the relative newness of the trade secret privilege. 173
1.

Prosecutor’s Knowledge or Possession

Prosecutors may argue that an algorithm is not Brady material because it
is not in the prosecutor’s “know[ledge]” or “possession,” 174 but rather possessed by a third-party proprietor. 175 However, this element of Brady is construed permissively—constructive knowledge or possession is sufficient. 176
Information is constructively within the prosecutor’s knowledge or possession
if the “prosecution team,” which includes “others acting on the government’s
behalf,” 177 knows or possesses it. 178 In other words, even if the prosecutor does
not actually know or possess the exculpatory information, knowledge or possession is imputed to the prosecutor if any entity assisting them does know or
possess it. 179
Courts have imputed information known or possessed by law enforcement witnesses and investigators, 180 crime labs, 181 crime lab technicians, 182
nurse examiners, 183 and expert witnesses 184 to prosecutors. While the law is
quite unsettled as to the scope of the prosecution team, 185 courts largely agree

172. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1393–94 (tracing the “wave” of criminal cases in the mid2000s in which defendants sought source code for breath test devices as well as courts’ rationales
for denying defense access, including that the code was not in the prosecutor’s “possession” or
that the code was not “relevant or material”); id. at 1360–61 (noting that though some courts
have adopted an explicit trade secret privilege, others have instead “more loosely” incorporated
trade secrecy as a consideration when evaluating defendants’ requests for access).
173. Id. at 1395 (citing People v. Superior Ct. (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 WL 139069, at
*6, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015)) (stating that the first explicit application of a trade secret
evidentiary privilege in a criminal case by any appeals court in the country was likely in 2015).
174. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 263 (1999).
175. See Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 76.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Linder, No. 12 CR 22, 2013 WL 812382, at *33 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
5, 2013) (noting that the prosecutor’s constructive knowledge or possession has been “broadly
construed”).
177. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
178. Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009).
179. In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 720 (Cal. 1998) (“[T]hose assisting the government’s case
are . . . its agents. By necessary implication, the duty is nondelegable at least to the extent the
prosecution remains responsible for any lapse in compliance.” (citations omitted)).
180. Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869–70 (2006); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 438.
181. Bracamontes v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53, 64 (Ct. App. 2019).
182. Brown, 952 P.2d at 719.
183. McCormick v. Parker, 821 F.3d 1240, 1246–48 (10th Cir. 2016); People v. Uribe, 76
Cal. Rptr. 3d 829, 846–47 (Ct. App. 2008).
184. State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 126 (W. Va. 2007); see also Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 63 (discussing Farris).
185. See United States v. Rosenschein, No. 16-4571, 2019 WL 2298810, at *5 (D.N.M. May
30, 2019) (“Unfortunately, there are few cases in which the Tenth Circuit has analyzed whether
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that whether a witness or source “constitutes a state actor for purposes of
Brady” requires an inquiry into “what the person did, not who the person
is.” 186 Thus, even if the entity is privately owned or employed, the function
served by the entity remains the primary focus. 187
For example, in Bracamontes v. Superior Court, a California state court
held that two private forensic labs were part of the prosecution team for Brady
purposes because the lab had “assisted in the government’s investigation” by
conducting DNA testing “in an effort to identify or exclude suspects.” 188 The
court emphasized that the lab received monetary payment from the government for its services. 189 Further, the court expressly disagreed with the prosecutor’s attempt to distinguish between private and government-run crime
labs. In “both cases,” the work was “conducted on behalf of the government.”
The private labs thus bore “the same relationship to the prosecution” as government labs, making it “reasonable to impute the private party’s knowledge
to the prosecution.” 190 Similarly, in State v. Farris, the West Virginia Supreme
Court held that a private, out-of-state forensic psychologist was part of the prosecution team because the psychologist had conducted her examinations “at the
request” of the prosecutor’s investigation team. 191 Thus, the knowledge she obtained was imputed to the prosecutors. 192
Algorithmic systems should likewise be evaluated based on what they do,
not who their proprietors are. 193 If the algorithmic system directly assists in
the investigation of a specific case, it is, like its human counterparts, “acting
on the government’s behalf.” For example, an algorithmic system that examines DNA evidence “in an effort to identify or exclude suspects” 194 is part of
the prosecution team even if the system is privately owned, just like the lab in

a person or entity is part of the prosecution team. . . . Outside the Tenth Circuit, there are few
cases that have set forth a framework for analyzing who is part of the prosecution team.”).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 298 (2d Cir. 2006); State v. Mullen,
259 P.3d 158, 169 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (citing Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th
Cir. 2009)).
187. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64 (private crime labs); McCormick, 821 F.3d at
1246–48 (nurse examiner at a privately owned hospital); Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 846–47 (same).
188. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 64–65.
191. State v. Farris, 656 S.E.2d 121, 126 (W. Va. 2007); see also Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 63 (discussing Farris).
192. Farris, 656 S.E.2d at 126.
193. This analogy is further bolstered by the fact that some proprietary algorithms are developed and owned by the government itself. E.g., Lauren Kirchner, Federal Judge Unseals New
York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence (Oct. 20, 2017, 8:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/federal-judge-unseals-new-york-crime-labs-software-foranalyzing-dna-evidence [perma.cc/Q4CX-CM6J] (describing New York City’s discontinued
probabilistic DNA genotyping tool).
194. Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64.
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Bracamontes. 195 A predictive system used to determine the scope of a criminal
conspiracy that examines a party “at the request” of investigators and provides
an “expert opinion,” as the forensic psychologist did in Farris, is part of the
prosecution team. 196 A facial recognition system that searches and identifies a
primary suspect is part of the prosecution team because it not only assists but
“effectively commence[s] the prosecution of th[e] case.” 197 On the other hand,
systems that are not directly “involved in the investigation of the case” 198 or
are used merely at trial for “perceptual content,” 199 as with content used to
prove a physical fact rather than the truth of the substance contained within, 200
may be less likely to constitute part of the prosecution team. But law enforcement algorithms deployed to assist in a specific criminal investigation should
largely be considered as “acting on the government’s behalf.” Ultimately, a
“case-by-case analysis” is required, algorithmic source or not. 201
Like the forensic psychologist in Farris and the crime labs in Bracamontes,
both of which were private entities, that an algorithmic system is owned by a
private company should not obviate the necessary inquiry into the algorithm’s
role in the investigation. This extension makes sense for two related reasons.
First, the underlying question of the “knowledge or possession” requirement
is “whether the [g]overnment should be held responsible for the actions” of
the entity. 202 When the government has affirmatively “instructed” or “contracted” the entity to conduct an investigative task, it is reasonable that the
government be held responsible, at least as to the scope of its request. 203 Sec-

195. Cf. People v. Wakefield, 107 N.Y.S.3d 487, 496–97 (App. Div. 2019) (“[A]lthough
[DNA tool proprietor] Cybergenetics is independent from law enforcement, at the time the
[DNA] report was generated, Cybergenetics was ‘acting in the role of assisting the police and
prosecutors in developing evidence for use at trial.’ ” (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 59 N.Y.S.3d
337, 345 (App. Div. 2017))).
196. Farris, 656 S.E.2d at 126.
197. United States v. Rosenschein, No. 16-4571, 2019 WL 2298810, at *6–7 (D.N.M. May
30, 2019) (holding that a government agency, even if it merely “forwarded [the defendant’s location] to law enforcement,” was still part of the prosecution team because it was “involved in
the investigation of the case[] and has provided information to the government in aid of the
prosecution” (emphasis omitted)).
198. Id. at *7 (emphasis omitted).
199. Roth, supra note 3, at 2005 (describing how FBI malware outputs would be probative
not for their “communicable content” but for their “perceptual content” because they would be
“offered not for their truth but to show that the computers then sent information back to the
FBI”).
200. One scholar’s example is that of a machine and its printout: the printout’s “perceptual
content” is that the machine and its ink toner were functioning at the time of printing. In contrast, the printout’s “communicable content” is the substance of the printout, the machine’s output or prediction used to prove the truth of a claim. Roth, supra note 3, at 2005.
201. See Avila v. Quarterman, 560 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 2009).
202. United States v. Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Bracamontes v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53, 65 (Ct. App. 2019).
203. Meregildo, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 445; Bracamontes, 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 64.
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ond, a permissive “knowledge or possession” requirement ensures that prosecutors do not have a perverse incentive to shield themselves from Brady material. 204 Otherwise, Brady protections “might be nullified simply by keeping
the prosecutor ignorant of information adverse to the government’s case.” 205
Likewise, Brady protections would be rendered toothless if prosecutors could
avoid Brady obligations by outsourcing investigative tasks to privately owned
algorithms. Indeed, many scholars have lamented this as a crucial problem of
privatizing state functions—a problem that is growing. 206 Opaque privatization risks “corporate capture” and the unaccountable exercise of public
power. 207 Thus, when the government decides to contract with the proprietor
of a law enforcement algorithm for use in a public, investigatory function, the
algorithm should be considered within the knowledge or possession of the
prosecutor.
2.

Material Either to Guilt or to Punishment

The materiality requirement—or its manipulation—may pose another
hurdle to defendants’ access to algorithmic information under Brady. Prosecutors are only obliged to disclose evidence “material either to guilt or to punishment” to the defendant. 208 Materiality thus serves two purposes. Before
trial, it is the threshold that instructs prosecutors on whether evidence must
be disclosed (material) or need not be disclosed (not material). 209 After trial,
it imposes on the defendant a requirement to prove harm, that is, to show that
there was a reasonable probability that the withheld evidence would have
changed the outcome of the trial had it been disclosed. 210 Thus, “materiality”
may be defined differently before and after trial, which may affect the defendant’s ability to access algorithmic information under Brady. While the post-trial
definition is firmly established, the pretrial standard is not.
After trial, the standard for materiality imposes a prejudice requirement—the disclosure must have created a “reasonable probability” of a different verdict. 211 Appellate judges should assess the trial record as a whole, 212
including trial transcripts, to decide whether the disclosure would have
204. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
205. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5:11 (2d ed. 2020).
206. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 18, at 1242–46.
207. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City,
20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 109 (2018).
208. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Janet C. Hoeffel & Stephen I.
Singer, Activating a Brady Pretrial Duty to Disclose: From the Mouths of Supreme Court Justices
to Practice, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 467, 467–68 (2014).
209. Id. at 470.
210. Id.
211. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also Hoeffel & Singer, supra note
208, at 470.
212. Riley E. Clafton, A Material Change to Brady: Rethinking Brady v. Maryland, Materiality, and Criminal Discovery, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 307, 347–48 (2020).
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changed the outcome. 213 However, appellate courts are hesitant to provide the
extraordinary post-trial remedy of overturning convictions based on a Brady
challenge. 214
The pretrial standard, in contrast to the established post-trial standard, is
contested. 215 The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that the pretrial standard is the same as the post-trial one. 216 Prosecutors, erroneously citing that
dicta as though it were binding precedent, may assert that they do not have a
pretrial or at-trial duty to disclose favorable evidence unless they determine
that there is a “reasonable probability” the evidence would change the outcome of the trial. 217 However, this lack of differentiation between pretrial and
post-trial standards has been widely critiqued. 218 Scholars lament that such a
pretrial standard is “literally impossible” to implement because “[f]rom the
pretrial perspective, it is absurd to ask a prosecutor to determine anything
about the outcome of a trial that has not yet occurred.” 219 Drawing on the
many unknowns of the future trial, prosecutors can “easily craft” some argument that disclosure of favorable information is unlikely to influence the trial
outcome. 220 This is particularly true with opaque and complex algorithms.
Given the unworkability of the standard, many courts have waived the materiality threshold, requiring the government to disclose all favorable information in its possession. 221 This is the prudent approach. 222 Unfortunately,
some courts continue to apply the prejudice standard before trial, which allows prosecutors to “hid[e] behind the cloak of materiality” to shirk their
Brady disclosure obligations at trial. 223 It would be quite difficult, then, for a

213. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 474.
214. E.g., Jessica Brand, The Epidemic of Brady Violations: Explained, APPEAL (Apr. 25,
2018),
https://theappeal.org/the-epidemic-of-brady-violations-explained-94a38ad3c800
[perma.cc/JH6B-NXBR].
215. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 470–71 (arguing that the Bagley standard for materiality was “strictly concerned with determining the appellate standard for reversal,” not pretrial or at-trial disclosures).
216. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995); Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208,
at 472.
217. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 469 (asserting that applying the appellate prejudice standard pretrial “turns a due process right of the accused meant to ensure a fair trial into
an entitlement of the prosecution to withhold favorable evidence”).
218. Id. at 485 (“In sum, at least five current members of the Supreme Court, several federal
district court judges, and the ethical rules of conduct all recognize the absurdity of applying Bagley’s post-trial prejudice standard to a prosecutor’s pretrial disclosure obligations . . . .”).
219. Id. at 474.
220. Id. at 477.
221. Cynthia E. Jones, Here Comes the Judge: A Model for Judicial Oversight and Regulation
of the Brady Disclosure Duty, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 87, 101 (2017).
222. See Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 473; Christopher Deal, Note, Brady Materiality Before Trial: The Scope of the Duty to Disclose and the Right to a Trial by Jury, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1780, 1801–04 (2007).
223. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 473; see, e.g., Lynch v. State, 260 So. 3d 1166,
1169–70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 59 (D.C. 2006).
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defendant to overcome such a high, prosecutor-defined pretrial standard to
obtain algorithmic evidence in time for trial. However, given the broad criticism of a pretrial prejudice requirement and the courts’ warning that “arguable cases” should err on the side of disclosure, 224 algorithmic information
should rarely be excluded before or at trial on the basis of a prosecutor-crafted
assessment of materiality. 225
III. THE MISSING ALGORITHM INSTRUCTION: AN AT-TRIAL SAFEGUARD
As shown in Part II, law enforcement algorithms are akin to human witnesses in that they perform similar functions in criminal investigations and
proceedings and raise similar issues related to credibility, reliability, and bias.
This analogy to human witnesses is not entirely novel; it has been raised by
practitioners and scholars 226 and was acknowledged as “creative” by at least
one court. 227 This Part extends the analogy to justify a possible solution for
situations in which the prosecutor or proprietor invokes a trade secret privilege despite a defendant’s request for disclosure of the algorithmic information.
Extending the analogy of algorithm as human witness, this Note proposes
that courts adapt the “missing witness” evidentiary rule 228 to “missing algorithms.” This adapted rule would deploy a jury instruction for missing algorithmic evidence to remedy conflicts between Brady’s constitutional mandate
and trade secrecy. This remedy provides a due process safeguard at trial without violating trade secrecy and without necessitating a solution as extraordinary as excluding algorithmic evidence altogether 229 or overturning 230 a
conviction on appeal.

224. Boyd, 908 A.2d at 61; see also Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470 n.15 (2009) (observing
that “the prudent prosecutor will . . . resolv[e] doubtful questions in favor of disclosure”); Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439–40 (1995) (same).
225. See Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 473.
226. E.g., People v. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 81 (Ct. App. 2018) (discussing defendant’s analogy of DNA analysis tool to human lab analyst and expert witness); Roth, supra
note 3, at 1972 (analogizing machine sources to human witnesses for Sixth Amendment rightto-confrontation purposes).
227. Superior Ct., 239 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 81.
228. The missing witness rule was developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Graves v.
United States, 150 U.S. 118 (1893), well before the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted. Since Graves, both federal and state courts have adopted
variations of the basic Graves rule in both civil and criminal contexts. While the missing witness
rule is not uniform from court to court, the rule is “alive and well.” Michelle M. Rutherford,
Avoiding Application of the Missing-Witness Rule, A.B.A. (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/articles/2013/avoiding-application-of-the-missing-witness-rule [perma.cc/H28Q-GNHX].
229. See Johnson EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 16.
230. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 430–31 (1995).
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A. The Missing Witness Instruction
The “missing witness” rule refers to the permissible inference a jury may
draw from the absence of a potential witness who might have knowledgeable
facts at issue in the case. 231 Take, for example, a defendant who is on trial for
a robbery of a store. The prosecutor calls one eyewitness, the store manager,
to testify before the jury. However, there were two eyewitnesses on the scene
that saw the robbery occur—the store owner also witnessed the incident. The
store owner, hostile to the robber, would be expected to testify favorably for
the prosecution. But the prosecutor declines to call the store owner to the
stand. The missing witness rule would allow the jury to infer that the prosecution refused to call the store owner because the owner’s testimony would
have been unfavorable (perhaps, for example, the store owner’s description of
the robber was inconsistent with the store manager’s). 232
The missing witness rule can be traced to the Supreme Court case Graves
v. United States, 233 and both the defense and prosecution are allowed to invoke
it in criminal trials. 234 There are two key prerequisites for a missing witness
instruction: (1) the witness must have been “peculiarly” available to the opposing party (the witness is available to the prosecution but not reasonably
accessible to the defense through other channels), and (2) the witness would
have elucidated “noncumulative” information (the information is not already
in the defense’s possession). 235 One of the rationales 236 underlying this rule is
spoliation, the suppression of evidence by a party. 237 The rule is intended to
deter concealment of evidence and to encourage disclosure of all relevant evidence. 238 The reasoning is that when a party fails to produce a witness that
knows facts about the case and the witness was “peculiarly available” to that

231. 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE
AND INSTRUCTIONS § 14.15 (6th ed. 2008).
232. The facts of this example are a simplified version of what occurred in People v. Hall,
960 N.E.2d 399 (N.Y. 2011). See also People v. Kitching, 583 N.E.2d 944, 946–47 (N.Y. 1991)
(granting defendant’s request for a missing witness instruction where prosecution called one
officer at trial but not the second officer when both officers witnessed the drug transaction at
issue in the case). In Hall, the appeals court agreed that the trial court had erred in refusing to
grant the defendant a missing witness instruction, but ultimately held that the error did not entitle relief because the defendant had failed to preserve the issue. Hall, 960 N.E.2d at 402.
233. 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
234. See O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 231, at 122–23.
235. Id. at 121.
236. Two other rationales include the “voucher” doctrine and “best evidence” doctrine.
The voucher doctrine is a common law concept that a party vouches for the credibility of the
witnesses that it calls to the stand. See Walker v. State, 818 A.2d 1078, 1086 (Md. 2003). The best
evidence doctrine instructs that “if it be found that there is any better evidence existing than is
produced, the very not producing it is a presumption that it would have detected some falsehood
that at present is concealed.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *368.
237. Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference—Quieting the Loud Voice
from the Empty Chair, 44 MD. L. REV. 137, 141 (1985).
238. Id.
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party but not the opposing party, the jury could “naturally” draw an adverse
inference from that failure. 239 The instruction is permissive, not mandatory—
juries are permitted to draw the inference but are not required to do so. If allowed by the court, the inference is typically included in the closing argument
to the jury and addressed by a jury instruction.
B. The Missing Algorithm Instruction
Similarly, a “missing algorithm” jury instruction would only be granted
when two prerequisites are met: (1) the algorithmic system is peculiarly available to the prosecution, and (2) the algorithmic system would elucidate noncumulative information. 240 In addition, because the instruction would only be
a remedy for Brady material, the instruction would only be available for algorithmic information that is “favorable” under Brady. 241
The missing algorithm instruction makes logical sense when trade secrecy
is invoked to exclude an algorithm. In a criminal trial, the prosecution must
prove each element of its case against the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt. 242 When law enforcement substantially relies on an algorithm in its investigation or when the prosecution introduces an algorithm’s output at trial
and examining the algorithm may reveal bias or unreliability or lack of credibility, Brady requires that the defendant be given access to that impeachment
material to help build their defense and persuade the jury that reasonable
doubt exists. 243 When Brady material is not disclosed, “irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution,” a Brady “suppression” occurs. 244 And
“justice suffers” when such a suppression occurs—even when a third-party
proprietor has commercial interests at stake. 245 Thus, as with missing witness
instructions, a jury should be permitted to draw a reasonable adverse inference from that suppression.
The missing algorithm instruction is also reasonable because government
entities wield significant market power. As the primary consumers of law enforcement technologies, government entities can choose which proprietors to
work with and how to craft their contractual relationships to ensure greater
transparency. 246 For example, a government could condition its purchase of
an algorithmic system on access to all documentation relating to the reliability
239. Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 126 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 17–22 for an overview of algorithmic systems’
components.
241. See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
242. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
243. Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 61 (D.C. 2006); see supra Part II.
244. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
245. See id.
246. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1262; Erik Bakke, Note, Predictive Policing: The Argument
for Public Transparency, 74 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 132–33 (2018) (observing that predictive policing tools had been adopted by 38 percent of police departments as of 2018 and that
a 70 percent adoption rate was expected within two to five years).
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of the system. The government could also secure limited permission to disclose any Brady information contained therein to defendants under a protective order. 247 In fact, some governmental entities already appear to be
considering adjusting their contractual requirements to enhance algorithmic
transparency. 248 The availability of a missing algorithm instruction would incentivize more governmental entities to do so.
Allowing the jury to draw an adverse inference from Brady suppression
when the government raises a valid trade secret privilege may appear harsh,
particularly since the trade secret holder is a private proprietor who is not a
party in the criminal case. For example, the private proprietor might resist
disclosure even when the prosecutor wishes to disclose. However, as discussed
in Part II, it is reasonable—and arguably necessary in many cases—to treat the
algorithmic system as acting on behalf of the government. 249 A prosecutor, in
their unique role as a representative of the government, 250 cannot instruct a
crime lab to help in its investigation or at trial, then shield the crime lab from
adversarial scrutiny. 251 Likewise, the prosecutor cannot have it both ways with
algorithmic systems. The government should be thinking about its Brady duties when it uses an algorithmic system to assist directly in an investigation or
trial, and it should only work with proprietors that will allow the government
to disclose the information it is constitutionally obliged to share with the defense. If the government imprudently contracts with a proprietor that refuses
to allow the required disclosures, the missing algorithm inference can remedy
that due process failure at trial.
Further, any harshness is mitigated by the prosecutor and proprietor’s viable alternative—disclosing the algorithm under a protective order. Protective
orders are issued routinely for trade secrets in the civil context. 252 These orders
even enable disclosure of a party’s trade secret to its direct competitor. 253 Such
routinely accepted safeguards in the civil context should likewise be sufficient
to protect trade secrets in criminal trials. 254 In light of the availability of protective orders, one scholar has suggested getting rid of the trade secret privilege in the criminal context altogether. 255
247. See Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 207, at 109.
248. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1262.
249. See supra Section II.B.1.
250. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) (quoting Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
251. Bracamontes v. Superior Ct., 255 Cal. Rptr. 3d 53, 64 (Ct. App. 2019).
252. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
253. See Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2240–41 (2014).
254. The use of protective orders may raise other constitutional concerns. For example,
protective orders would not allow members of the public or press to access the algorithm, which
may violate the public’s First Amendment right to receive information and ideas and to engage
in democratic discourse. Vera Eidelman, The First Amendment Case for Public Access to Secret
Algorithms Used in Criminal Trials, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 915, 934–35 (2018).
255. Wexler, supra note 62, at 1403.

190

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:157

While removing the privilege from the criminal context altogether would
promote transparency and accountability, trends suggest the use of trade secrets to prevent Brady disclosures is on the rise. 256 Proprietors are aggressively
and increasingly raising the privilege or asking governments to sign nondisclosure agreements at the outset. 257 And courts appear to be increasingly sympathetic to trade secret arguments at each stage of a criminal case. 258 In light
of this trend, a missing algorithm instruction would provide a much-needed
due process backstop. While the remedy does not provide the immediate
transparency that full disclosure in all cases would, it provides longer-term
incentives for the government to choose transparent practices and tools. This,
in turn, would incentivize proprietors to develop transparent solutions. 259
Outside of protective orders, the remedies currently available to defendants are either to request complete exclusion of the algorithmic evidence at
trial or dismissal of the charges 260 or to file a post-trial appeal seeking to overturn the conviction altogether. Neither is a satisfactory solution. The former
risks providing the defendant with a windfall and punishing the prosecutor
for raising a privilege. 261 Further, the former would rarely provide defendants
relief given how difficult it is for defendants to exclude evidence at trial successfully. 262 Nor would the former provide any relief for defendants deprived
of Brady evidence not introduced at trial (like a facial recognition tool that
provided many other possible suspects). The latter may force the defendant to

256. See id. at 1360 (first citing State v. Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 SEA, slip op. at 3 n.1 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Jan. 12, 2017), ECR No. 383; then citing State’s Response to Def. Motion to Compel
TrueAllele Source Code at 12–13, Fair, No. 10-1-09274-5 SEA, ECR No. 258; and then citing
Letter Regarding Motion to Quash at 2, United States v. Johnson, No. 15-cr-00565 (S.D.N.Y.
June 15, 2016)).
257. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1262 (explaining how the City of San Francisco has
“rarely fought language in contracts with third-party vendors that recognized that the algorithms
must be kept from the public”); Joh, supra note 95, at 23–26.
258. For example, in People v. Johnson, the prosecution resisted disclosure of the TrueAllele probabilistic DNA genotyping tool by raising a trade secret privilege. People v. Johnson, No.
F071640, 2019 WL 3025229, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. July 11, 2019); see also People v. Superior Ct.,
239 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 77 (Ct. App. 2018). This is the case not just in the Brady context but in a
wide variety of cases. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1240 (discussing scholarship tracking how
“nondisclosure privileges have grown, leading to trends that tend to favor commercial interests
over public ones”).
259. Katyal, supra note 18, at 1220.
260. See Johnson EFF Amicus Brief, supra note 57, at 16.
261. Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH.
U. L.Q. 713, 717 (1999); see Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 1450, 1467–68 (2006).
262. To exclude evidence on the grounds that it would lead to unfair prejudice, a party
must show that the evidence is “so inflammatory on its face” that it would divert the jury from
material issues. United States v. Huyck, 849 F.3d 432, 440 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Jim Hilbert,
The Disappointing History of Science in the Courtroom: Frye, Daubert, and the Ongoing Crisis of
“Junk Science” in Criminal Trials, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 759, 762–63 (2019) (lamenting that courts’
failure to exclude even “junk science” in criminal cases has “undoubtedly resulted in wrongful
convictions”).
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spend years in prison while the appeal is pending 263 and requires the appellate
court to conduct a difficult hindsight review of whether the admission of the
evidence was prejudicial. 264
The missing algorithm instruction provides a more balanced alternative
to those “extreme” solutions. 265 It permits the jury, rather than requiring the
judge, to balance the defendants’ access to algorithms and proprietors’ trade
secrecy concerns. Allowing the jury to draw an inference in favor of the defendant is not a punitive measure against the prosecutor; 266 it is a due process
safeguard, one that is appropriate given the prosecutor’s ability to allow access
under a protective order as an alternative.
A missing algorithm instruction might take the following form:
In order for the defendant to receive a fair trial, the government is required
to inform the defense of any information known to the government that casts
doubt on the credibility of the government’s own evidence. In this case, the
government failed to turn over promptly information favorable to the defense, namely [algorithmic material], of which the defense learned only on
[date], when [means of disclosure]. The government has declined to disclose
this information because of trade secret (intellectual property) concerns. The
government had the option to disclose the information under a protective
order. Although this denial of access does not necessarily bear on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, you may, if you think it appropriate in light of
all the evidence, take into account the possible harm to the defense caused
by this denial when evaluating whether the government has proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 267

This instruction clearly conveys the government’s disclosure duty—and
its breach of that duty—to the jury. But it also conveys the reason for that
breach and asks the jury to consider any inferences in consideration of that
fact. Additionally, the jury is instructed to consider “all the evidence.” That
evidence would include any validation studies for the algorithm the prosecutor may have produced at trial. Whether the jury would deem the validation
studies sufficient would depend on whether the studies were independently
conducted, the studies’ methodology, and other indicia of their credibility. 268
The missing algorithm instruction would therefore encourage prosecutors to

263. See Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 62 (D.C. 2006); see also Deal, supra note 222,
at 1783, 1783 n.26.
264. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 575–80 (2004).
265. See Katherine Kwong, Note, The Algorithm Says You Did It: The Use of Black Box
Algorithms to Analyze Complex DNA Evidence, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275, 279 (2017).
266. But see Jones, supra note 8, at 447–52 (proposing adverse-inference instructions for
intentional Brady suppressions).
267. This example instruction has been modeled on the adverse-inference instructions
proposed by other scholars in nonalgorithmic Brady contexts, including Dewar, supra note 261,
at 1457–60, and Jones, supra note 8, at 450–52.
268. See Katyal, supra note 18, at 1245 (discussing breath-test-device proprietor’s invocation of trade secrecy to block independent testing of the device).
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submit those studies at the outset and reward governmental entities that contract with transparent and credible proprietors. Further, “all the evidence”
means that an adverse inference would not be drawn when the prosecution
has presented a strong case bolstered by other witnesses and evidence. In contrast, an adverse inference is more likely to be drawn when the algorithm provides the key or sole piece of evidence. 269
The instruction would be requested by the defense in a motion before or
at trial. The timing would largely depend on when the suppression came to
light. If requested at trial, the defense would make its request outside of the
jury’s presence. Ultimately, the decision to grant this remedy would be within
the trial court’s discretion. The trial court could also give more specific instructions and limit the defendant’s closing argument as to the scope of the
adverse inference that can be drawn.
Admittedly, a missing algorithm instruction is far from a cure-all. One
significant situation in which this remedy would not be curative is when prosecutors do not even disclose the use of law enforcement algorithms. 270 Unfortunately, this has happened in many cases in which a novel algorithm aided
the investigation. 271 As a result, most defendants do not know that an algorithm
was involved in their investigation unless that information is serendipitously
discovered. 272 For example, Willie Lynch discovered that facial recognition
technology was used to identify him only eight days before his trial. 273 Many
defendants never find out even after they are convicted. 274 One striking example: in Pinella County, Florida, law enforcement used facial recognition technology for fifteen years without ever providing the public defender’s office any
indication of its use in Brady disclosures. 275 Fortunately, organizations are becoming increasingly vigilant about law enforcement uses of algorithmic
tools. 276 And the availability of a missing-algorithm-instruction remedy may
encourage more defense attorneys in pretrial discovery to learn whether an
algorithm was used against their client.
Another shortcoming of this remedy is that defendants will still have to
satisfy the Brady hurdles of “knowledge or possession” and “materiality.” But
as explained in Part II, the human-witness analogy—which highlights the
common need for due process safeguards between algorithmic tools and human witnesses—helps show why law enforcement algorithms should in most
cases clear these two hurdles. Defendants who can overcome these Brady prerequisites will be able to request the jury-instruction remedy at trial instead of

269. See, e.g., Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 10 (noting that sole defense
raised was misidentification).
270. See id. at 1.
271. See supra text accompanying note 124.
272. See Jones, supra note 8, at 433 & n.81.
273. Lynch ACLU Amicus Brief, supra note 28, at 1.
274. See supra note 124.
275. LAPERRUQUE, supra note 128.
276. See, e.g., RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 143, at 17–18.
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having to wait until an appeal. And courts are more likely to grant this less
extreme remedy than to overturn a conviction entirely. 277
Critics of this remedy may raise two additional concerns. First, critics may
argue that the defense will be able to “create” reasonable doubt among jurors
by overinflating how favorable or material the algorithmic information is. 278
However, “[d]isclosure law cannot be predicated on the assumption that juries
are [so] irrational” that a missing algorithm instruction would induce them to
arbitrarily or capriciously discount the prosecution’s case. 279 And the risk of creating reasonable doubt can be mitigated by a more tailored jury instruction. 280
Second, critics may argue that the traditional missing witness rule is disfavored in some jurisdictions and should be limited rather than extended. But
courts’ concerns over this rule usually involve adverse inferences drawn
against the defendant—not the prosecutor. 281 Those concerns make sense
given that defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and are not required to produce any evidence or any witnesses. Allowing the jury to draw
an adverse inference against the defendant would risk shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant. But law enforcement algorithms serve the prosecution
team. The prosecutor bears the burden of convincing a jury that there is no
reasonable doubt of guilt, and failing to produce the witness whose testimony
was relied upon in the investigation or at trial may very well raise reasonable
doubt. Therefore, the missing algorithm instruction would merely notify the
jury that it should decide, in light of the other evidence presented, whether or
not the prosecution team’s decision to disallow access and prevent the defendant from testing the algorithm’s credibility is significant enough to raise doubt.
CONCLUSION
As privately developed law enforcement algorithms proliferate, due process protections must keep pace. While algorithmic systems may be a costeffective solution for efficient investigations and prosecutions, “[s]ociety wins
not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair.” 282 Yet
trade secret evidentiary privileges are increasingly shielding algorithms from
scrutiny. To ensure the continued fairness of the criminal justice system, a
new due process safeguard is necessary. The missing algorithm instruction, an
at-trial solution, may provide just that.

See Dewar, supra note 261, at 1457.
Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 480.
Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64
MERCER L. REV. 639, 675 (2013).
280. Hoeffel & Singer, supra note 208, at 480.
281. O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 231; see also Harris v. State, 182 A.3d 821, 825 (Md. 2018).
282. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
277.
278.
279.

